Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2571802
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009zbMath1100.91004MaRDI QIDQ2571802
Publication date: 14 November 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3083
Related Items
Log-linear dynamics and local potential, Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games, Potential games in volatile environments, Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets, Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example, On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games, Strategic complementarities and nested potential games, Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection, \(p\)-best response set, Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry, Robust equilibria under non-common priors, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities., The logit-response dynamics, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games, Dynamics in near-potential games, Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria, Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games, \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Best response equivalence
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Potential games
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Potential games: A purely ordinal approach
- Best-response potential games
- \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Me\fehler und Information
- Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
