Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
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Publication:2571802
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009zbMath1100.91004OpenAlexW2117039873MaRDI QIDQ2571802
Publication date: 14 November 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3083
Related Items (32)
Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ \(p\)-best response set ⋮ Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games ⋮ Value‐based distance between information structures ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Log-linear dynamics and local potential ⋮ Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games ⋮ Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games ⋮ Dynamics in near-potential games ⋮ Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets ⋮ Fashion and Homophily ⋮ Ordinal potentials in smooth games ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games ⋮ Strategic complementarities and nested potential games ⋮ Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection ⋮ On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations ⋮ Evolutionary potential games on lattices ⋮ Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games ⋮ Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information ⋮ Potential games in volatile environments ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors ⋮ The logit-response dynamics ⋮ Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information ⋮ Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. ⋮ Two-person pairwise solvable games ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
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