Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.021zbMath1284.91055OpenAlexW2109124001MaRDI QIDQ2434240

Marion Oury

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/10109

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessequilibrium selectionglobal gamesstrategic complementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Speculative attacks with multiple targets ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Cites Work

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• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

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