Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
From MaRDI portal
Publication:660089
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005zbMath1273.91087MaRDI QIDQ660089
Publication date: 25 January 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005
Related Items
On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games, Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection, Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games, Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture, A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
Cites Work
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Potential games
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
