Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric 3 3 example

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.06.005zbMATH Open1273.91087OpenAlexW3121435786MaRDI QIDQ660089FDOQ660089

Authors: Jun Honda 

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005

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zbMATH Keywords

global gamespotential gamesequilibrium selectionsupermodular gamesmonotone potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Cites Work

• Potential games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• An approach to equilibrium selection
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination

Cited In (6)

• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
• Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture
• Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

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