Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric 3 3 example

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.06.005MaRDI QIDQ660089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jun Honda

Publication date 25 January 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

global gamespotential gamesequilibrium selectionsupermodular gamesmonotone potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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Cites work

• A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
• An approach to equilibrium selection
• Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
• Potential games
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential

Cited in

(6)

• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture
• A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
• Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Every symmetric 3 3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

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