Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1621732
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0609-3zbMath1417.91013OpenAlexW2783869359WikidataQ123359003 ScholiaQ123359003MaRDI QIDQ1621732
Publication date: 9 November 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0609-3
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Generic \(4\times 4\) two person games have at most 15 Nash equilibria
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- New maximal numbers of equilibria in bimatrix games
- A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game
- On the maximal number of Nash equilibria in an \(n\times n\) bimatrix game
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Potential games
- A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game.
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games
