Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
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Publication:4859517
DOI10.2307/2171774zbMath0841.90127OpenAlexW2124874567MaRDI QIDQ4859517
Klaus Ritzberger, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 7 January 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171774
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