Nash blocks
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Publication:2121456
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00784-yzbMath1483.91021OpenAlexW4248433986MaRDI QIDQ2121456
Publication date: 4 April 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00784-y
Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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