\(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004zbMath1177.91019MaRDI QIDQ2507683

Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

robustness; incomplete information; refinements; risk-dominance; \(p\)-dominance; higher order uncertainty; set-valued concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

Related Items

Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets, \(p\)-best response set, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria, Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria, ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY

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