On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.001zbMath1419.91024OpenAlexW2905511141MaRDI QIDQ1729662

Kym Pram

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrobustnessincomplete informationcorrelated equilibriumpotential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (2)

Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

Cites Work

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• Potential games
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• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Robust Mechanism Design

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