Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
DOI10.1142/8318zbMATH Open1278.91003OpenAlexW2141806448MaRDI QIDQ4902604FDOQ4902604
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Publication date: 16 January 2013
Published in: World Scientific Series in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/8318
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Cited In (12)
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
- Contests with dominant strategies
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Stress tests and information disclosure
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