Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
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Publication:4902604
Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Collected or selected works; reprintings or translations of classics (01A75)
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Cited in
(18)- Robust Mechanism Design
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- Quasi-robust multiagent contracts
- Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Contests with dominant strategies
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Stress tests and information disclosure
- Robust mechanism design of exchange
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
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