Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin

DOI10.1142/8318MaRDI QIDQ4902604zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 16 January 2013

Published in World Scientific Series in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/8318

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Collected or selected works; reprintings or translations of classics (01A75) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(22)

• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
• Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Contests with dominant strategies
• Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Quasi-robust multiagent contracts
• Robust mechanism design of exchange
• Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
• Continuous level-k mechanism design
• Information requirements for mechanism design
• Topology-free type structures with conditioning events
• Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

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