Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers

DOI10.1016/J.LAA.2019.04.027MaRDI QIDQ2321352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Bo Lin, Ngoc Mai Tran

Publication date 29 August 2019

Published in Linear Algebra and its Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.05218

zbMATH Keywords

tropical geometrymechanism designRoberts' theoremtropical determinanttropical hyperplane arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Abstract: In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible outcome functions which are not affine maximizers. Using tools from linear algebra and tropical geometry, we prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given outcome function can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorems are the strongest possible in this setup.

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Cited in

(2)

• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Tropical optimal transport and Wasserstein distances

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