Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
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Publication:3100563
Linear programming (90C05) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)
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- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
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- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- The axiomatics of economic design, Vol. 1. An introduction to theory and methods
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
- Communication in Mechanism Design
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Mechanisms for linear programs
- Kalai and Muller's possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
- Welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium
- Ordinal allocation
- The design of a dynamic allocation mechanism for the federal energy assistance program LIHEAP
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Game efficiency through linear programming duality
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Data-driven contract design
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Pricing lotteries
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Simple majority rule and integer programming
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
- Game theory and mechanism design
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Testing the quantal response hypothesis
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- The combinatorial world (of auctions) according to GARP
- Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Non-linear pricing by convex duality
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Robust screening under ambiguity
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