Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
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Publication:3100563
zbMATH Open1233.91004MaRDI QIDQ3100563FDOQ3100563
Authors: Rakesh V. Vohra 
Publication date: 24 November 2011
Recommendations
Linear programming (90C05) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)
Cited In (70)
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- The axiomatics of economic design, Vol. 1. An introduction to theory and methods
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
- Mechanisms for linear programs
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Ordinal allocation
- Game efficiency through linear programming duality
- Data-driven contract design
- Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists
- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Communication in Mechanism Design
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
- Kalai and Muller's possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version
- Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
- Welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- The design of a dynamic allocation mechanism for the federal energy assistance program LIHEAP
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Pricing lotteries
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Simple majority rule and integer programming
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Game theory and mechanism design
- Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Testing the quantal response hypothesis
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- The combinatorial world (of auctions) according to GARP
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Non-linear pricing by convex duality
- Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Robust screening under ambiguity
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