Data-driven contract design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105900MaRDI QIDQ6604785zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Justin Burkett, Maxwell Rosenthal

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• The complexity of contracts
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robust incentives for information acquisition

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• On the proof of the existence of undominated strategies in normal form games
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

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