Data-driven contract design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105900MaRDI QIDQ6604785zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Justin Burkett, Maxwell Rosenthal

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105900

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• The complexity of contracts
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robust incentives for information acquisition

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• On the proof of the existence of undominated strategies in normal form games
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

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