Learning approximately optimal contracts
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Publication:6109528
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_19zbMath1520.91223arXiv1811.06736OpenAlexW4297821671MaRDI QIDQ6109528
Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas, Moran Koren
Publication date: 28 July 2023
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.06736
Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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