Combinatorial agency

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.010zbMATH Open1258.91082OpenAlexW4252711114MaRDI QIDQ417616FDOQ417616

Authors: Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, Eyal Winter 

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.010

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zbMATH Keywords

incentivescontractsmoral hazardagency theoryhidden-action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Contracting with Externalities
• Joint production in teams

Cited In (21)

• Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization
• The complexity of contracts
• Delegated online search
• Optimal task assignments
• Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• Combinatorial agency of threshold functions
• Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
• Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• Exploiting social influence in networks
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• Technology, team production and incentives
• Multi-agent contracts
• Contribution games in networks
• Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: An evolutionary approach
• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• Online team formation under different synergies
• Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts

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