Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
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PotentialSimultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tatônnement)Supermodular gamesUnique implementation
Recommendations
- Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
- Coordination and externalities
- Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty
- On contractual approach in competitive economies with constrained coalitional structures
- Contracting with Externalities
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Externalities and bargaining disagreement
- Contractual \(M\)-core and equilibrium allocations
Cites work
- A Generalization of the Maximum Theorem
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Contracting with Externalities
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Potential games
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
Cited in
(29)- The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining
- Coordination and externalities
- Bertrand competition under network externalities
- Market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics
- Optimal contracting in networks
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- On discrimination in the optimal management of teams
- Contracting with externalities and outside options
- Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information
- Combinatorial agency
- Testing passive versus symmetric beliefs in contracting with externalities
- Collective hold‐up
- NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS
- Pay equality among heterogeneous agents
- Screening while controlling an externality
- Exploiting social influence in networks
- Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
- Strategic complementarity in games
- How do digital advertising auctions impact product prices?
- Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams
- Weight-ranked divide-and-conquer contracts
- Using divide-and-conquer to improve tax collection
- Adversarial coordination and public information design
- Implementation via information design in binary-action supermodular games
- Network-based peer monitoring design
- When can an outsider bribe voters one by one at a negligible cost?
- Incentives and discrimination: a functional optimization approach
- Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
- Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
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