Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5zbMath1059.91055MaRDI QIDQ1421881

I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

PotentialSupermodular gamesSimultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tatônnement)Unique implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Bertrand competition under network externalities ⋮ The timing of contracting with externalities ⋮ Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS ⋮ Pay equality among heterogeneous agents ⋮ Combinatorial agency ⋮ Screening while controlling an externality ⋮ Exploiting social influence in networks ⋮ On discrimination in the optimal management of teams ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics ⋮ The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining ⋮ Optimal contracting in networks

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Potential games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• A Generalization of the Maximum Theorem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Contracting with Externalities
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

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