NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS

DOI10.1111/IERE.12587zbMath1530.91216OpenAlexW4281565000MaRDI QIDQ6088652

Christodoulos Stefanadis, Jay Pil Choi

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12587

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts
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