Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
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Publication:960277
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.001zbMATH Open1151.91456OpenAlexW2062705828MaRDI QIDQ960277FDOQ960277
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.001
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Contracting with Externalities
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Dynamic common agency.
Cited In (12)
- Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Contract design and bargaining power
- Coercion, contract and the limits of the market
- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Collective hold‐up
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- Group targeting under networked synergies
- Contracting with Externalities
- Sequential vote buying
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