Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
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Publication:960277
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Contracting with Externalities
- Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Dynamic common agency.
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- The timing of contracting with externalities
Cited in
(14)- Bargaining and negative externalities
- Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Coercion, contract and the limits of the market
- Contract design and bargaining power
- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Collective hold‐up
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- Group targeting under networked synergies
- Contracting with Externalities
- Sequential vote buying
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