Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.03.002MaRDI QIDQ553497zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant

Publication date 27 July 2011

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

self-regulationnegotiationregulation preemptionvoluntary agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
• Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
• Contract negotiation and the Coase conjecture: a strategic foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts
• A bargaining theory of the firm
• Instrument choice when regulators and firms bargain
• Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core

Cites work

• Non-binding voluntary agreements
• Voluntary environmental agreements: Good or bad news for environmental protection?

Cited in

(6)

• On the incentive for a self-interested policymaker to mimic the behavior of a social-welfare maximizer
• Voluntary regulation: evidence from medicare payment reform
• The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing
• Self-Regulation and Government Oversight
• Private politics and public regulation
• Non-binding voluntary agreements

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