Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts

DOI10.1007/S00291-013-0351-6MaRDI QIDQ2454342zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francois Larmande

Publication date 13 June 2014

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-013-0351-6

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitymoral hazardperformance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

Cites work

• Costly Contract Contingencies
• Earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(5)

• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Flexible contracts
• Communication and Income Smoothing Through Accounting Method Choice
• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
• Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate

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