Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105229MaRDI QIDQ2067409zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Szydlowski, Ji Hee Yoon

Publication date 18 January 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1543.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitycontinuous timeovercompensationprincipal-agent model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard

Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time
• Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4125214 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1825523 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3204015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3270874 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
• Learning and Wage Dynamics
• Mathematical methods for financial markets.
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Robust control and model misspecification
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Second order ordinary differential equations with fully nonlinear two point boundary conditions. II
• Stochastic calculus for finance. II: Continuous-time models.
• Stochastic differential equations. An introduction with applications.
• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• The design of ambiguous mechanisms
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Optimal Control of a Stochastic System
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*

Cited in

(12)

• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• Robust contracting and corporate-termism
• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Flexible contracts
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and the incentive problem with interim participation constraints
• Research on investment incorporating both environmental performance and long (short) term financial performance of firms
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

This page was built for publication: Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2067409)