Robust contracts with one-sided commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2020.103942OpenAlexW3035204986MaRDI QIDQ2661649

Yingjie Niu, Jinqiang Yang, Zhentao Zou

Publication date: 7 April 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103942

zbMATH Keywords

wage dynamicsmodel uncertaintyrisk sharinglimited commitmentambiguity sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Robust leverage dynamics without commitment

Cites Work

• Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
• A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• MARKET‐BASED INCENTIVES

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