Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1073-9zbMath1422.91200MaRDI QIDQ2323573

Bo Sun, Lei Lu, Qi Liu

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2017/files/ifdp1195.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

options; ambiguity; relative performance evaluation; executive compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91G20: Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.)

Related Items

Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties, Robust contracts with one-sided commitment

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