Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1073-9MaRDI QIDQ2323573zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qi Liu, Lei Lu, Bo Sun

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2017/files/ifdp1195.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityexecutive compensationoptionsrelative performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20)

Recommendations

• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and the incentive problem with interim participation constraints
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

Cites work

• A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are
• Bayesian learning with multiple priors and nonvanishing ambiguity
• Estimating ambiguity aversion in a portfolio choice experiment
• Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
• How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
• Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian Uncertainty
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts

Cited in

(16)

• Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• Contracting under uncertainty: a principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties
• New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
• Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
• The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
• Risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and the incentive problem with interim participation constraints
• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

This page was built for publication: Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2323573)