Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.002MaRDI QIDQ900449zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Kellner

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/408445/1/tour.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversiontournamentsincentive contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Cites work

• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
• Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
• Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Common shocks and relative compensation
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
• Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
• Heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes: a field experiment among small-scale stock investors in China
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Learning from ambiguous urns
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Ordering ambiguous acts
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice
• Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution

Cited in

(4)

• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice

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