Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:900449
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.002zbMATH Open1330.91115OpenAlexW2124941520MaRDI QIDQ900449FDOQ900449
Authors: Christian Kellner
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/408445/1/tour.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
- Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Ordering ambiguous acts
- Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
- Learning from ambiguous urns
- Heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes: a field experiment among small-scale stock investors in China
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Common shocks and relative compensation
- The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q900449)