Information in tournaments under limited liability

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.06.002zbMATH Open1153.91630OpenAlexW2130036810MaRDI QIDQ999734FDOQ999734

Authors Jörg Budde

Publication date 10 February 2009

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927

zbMATH Keywords

informationcontesttournamentlikelihood ratio distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 627762 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of extremum problems related to agency models with imperfect monitoring
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Contest architecture
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(5)

• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• An envelope approach to tournament design
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

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