A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00674-4MaRDI QIDQ2178639zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Daniel Danau, Annalisa Vinella

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00674-4

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityinformative signalslimited liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
• Information in tournaments under limited liability
• Calibrated incentive contracts

Cites work

• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

Cited in

(4)

• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

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