Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0131zbMATH Open0877.90010OpenAlexW1976454795MaRDI QIDQ1361868FDOQ1361868

Authors: Jacques P. Lawarrée, Marc A. Van Audenrode 

Publication date: 11 December 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0131

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zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractlimited liabilityimperfect output observation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cited In (8)

• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
• Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
• Robustness of a fixed-rent contract in a standard agency model
• Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations

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