Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0131MaRDI QIDQ1361868zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacques P. Lawarrée, Marc A. Van Audenrode

Publication date 11 December 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0131

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractlimited liabilityimperfect output observation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cited in

(8)

• Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance
• Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
• Robustness of a fixed-rent contract in a standard agency model
• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

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