Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.11.016MaRDI QIDQ2328554zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Parimal Kanti Bag, Neng Qian

Publication date 10 October 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.016

zbMATH Keywords

money burningsubjective evaluationlimited liabilitywage compressionpay for performance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

Cited in

(3)

• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• The bonding cost in subjective performance evaluation

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