Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.11.016zbMATH Open1422.91415OpenAlexW2901856691MaRDI QIDQ2328554FDOQ2328554

Authors: Parimal Kanti Bag, Neng Qian 

Publication date: 10 October 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.016

Recommendations

• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
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• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

zbMATH Keywords

money burningsubjective evaluationlimited liabilitywage compressionpay for performance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

Cited In (3)

• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• The bonding cost in subjective performance evaluation

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