Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3342731 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3376956 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the Ocs
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(42)- Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
- Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
- Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance
- The principal-agent problem with adaptive players
- Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
- Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
- Principal-agent models
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
- Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments
- Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
- Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
- A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
- Outsourcing of innovation
- Delegated management in dynamic duopolies
- Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
- Data-driven incentive design in the medicare shared savings program
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
- A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
- Implicit contracts with effort incentives
- Lineare versus sprungfixe Erfolgsbeteiligung. (Linear versus piecewise constant reward schemes)
- Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
- Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
- The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon
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