Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:755409
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5zbMath0417.90005OpenAlexW2041317668MaRDI QIDQ755409
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
Pareto optimalityimperfect informationincentive compatibilityallocation of resourcesprincipal-agent relationshipsharing rulesdecision-making of economic agentsunobservable variable
Related Items
Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems ⋮ Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective ⋮ The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model ⋮ Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations ⋮ PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM ⋮ Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments ⋮ Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts ⋮ Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted ⋮ Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection ⋮ Search equilibrium with unobservable investment ⋮ Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty ⋮ Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation ⋮ Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification ⋮ A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem ⋮ Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat ⋮ Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity ⋮ The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification ⋮ Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems ⋮ Implicit contracts with effort incentives ⋮ Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program ⋮ Limited liability contracts between principal and agent ⋮ Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Lineare versus sprungfixe Erfolgsbeteiligung. (Linear versus piecewise constant reward schemes) ⋮ Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures ⋮ Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon ⋮ Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk ⋮ DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN DYNAMIC DUOPOLIES ⋮ Outsourcing of innovation ⋮ Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory ⋮ Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard ⋮ The principal-agent problem with adaptive players ⋮ Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance ⋮ Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents ⋮ Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge ⋮ Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models ⋮ A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
Cites Work
