Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5zbMATH Open0417.90005OpenAlexW2041317668MaRDI QIDQ755409FDOQ755409

Milton Harris, Artur Raviv

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityincentive compatibilityimperfect informationallocation of resourcesprincipal-agent relationshipsharing rulesdecision-making of economic agentsunobservable variable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the Ocs
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (42)

• Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
• Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
• Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance
• The principal-agent problem with adaptive players
• Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
• Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
• Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
• Outsourcing of innovation
• Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
• Implicit contracts with effort incentives
• Lineare versus sprungfixe Erfolgsbeteiligung. (Linear versus piecewise constant reward schemes)
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
• Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
• DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN DYNAMIC DUOPOLIES
• The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification
• Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
• Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem
• Principal-Agent Models
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
• Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon

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