Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
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Publication:1067985
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90095-XzbMATH Open0579.90014MaRDI QIDQ1067985FDOQ1067985
Authors: John C. Fellingham, D. Paul Newman, Yoon S. Suh 
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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moral hazarddomain additivitymemory contractoptimal multiperiod contractspreference separabilityrepeated agency game
Cites Work
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Cited In (4)
- Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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