Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90168-CMaRDI QIDQ1311269zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Richard A. Young, John C. Fellingham

Publication date 23 January 1994

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90168-c

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207455 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

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