Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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Publication:3748017
aggregationBrownian motionmoral hazardprincipal-agent problemsconstant absolute risk aversionlinear incentive schemesincentives over timepiece-rates
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- Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
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- Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents
- A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
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- Optimal contracts and asset prices in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem
- Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
- Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
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- Optimal Brokerage Contracts in Almgren–Chriss Model with Multiple Clients
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- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
- Robust contracting under double moral hazard
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- Optimal contract for a fund manager with capital injections and endogenous trading constraints
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- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
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- Entropic Optimal Planning for Path-Dependent Mean Field Games
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games
- Optimal design of the guarantee for defined contribution funds
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- Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
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- Optimal team incentives with CES production
- Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Generic property of the partial calmness condition for bilevel programming problems
- Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
- Channel coordination in logistics service supply chain considering fairness
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
- Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
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