Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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Publication:3748017
DOI10.2307/1913238zbMATH Open0608.90001OpenAlexW2106580408WikidataQ56481612 ScholiaQ56481612MaRDI QIDQ3748017FDOQ3748017
Authors: Bengt Holmstrom, Paul R. Milgrom 
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d07/d0742.pdf
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aggregationBrownian motionmoral hazardprincipal-agent problemsconstant absolute risk aversionlinear incentive schemesincentives over timepiece-rates
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- Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
- Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
- On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
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- Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
- Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
- Agency-based asset pricing
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- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
- Pricing and balancing of the sea-cargo service chain with empty equipment repositioning
- Linked recursive preferences and optimality
- Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation
- Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers
- Optimal design of the guarantee for defined contribution funds
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- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
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- An incentive contract for leadtime reduction in an \((S-1,S)\) inventory system
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- Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
- Participation in moral hazard problems
- A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
- Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network
- On the design of piece-rate contracts
- Conditional Analysis and a Principal-Agent Problem
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Optimal contract for a fund manager with capital injections and endogenous trading constraints
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games
- The principal-agent problem when the agent has access to outside markets
- Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Financial innovation and risk: the role of information
- An analytically solvable principal-agent model
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
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