Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

DOI10.2307/1913238zbMath0608.90001OpenAlexW2106580408WikidataQ56481612 ScholiaQ56481612MaRDI QIDQ3748017

Bengt Holmstrom, Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d07/d0742.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationBrownian motionmoral hazardprincipal-agent problemsconstant absolute risk aversionlinear incentive schemesincentives over timepiece-rates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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