Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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Publication:3748017
aggregationBrownian motionmoral hazardprincipal-agent problemsconstant absolute risk aversionlinear incentive schemesincentives over timepiece-rates
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Financial innovation and risk: the role of information
- Time-inconsistent contract theory
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- Incentive mechanism design problem based on gradient dynamics
- An analytically solvable principal-agent model
- Performance pay, trade and inequality
- Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Optimal electricity demand response contracting with responsiveness incentives
- Pricing and allotment in a sea-cargo supply chain with reference effect: a dynamic game approach
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
- Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
- Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Optimal portfolio allocations with tracking error volatility and stochastic hedging constraints
- Efficient dark markets
- Profit sharing agreements in decentralized supply chains: a distributionally robust approach
- Unit-sphere games
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Corporate insurance and managerial incentives
- Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
- Optimal make-take fees in a multi market-maker environment
- Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
- Multi-task agency with unawareness
- Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Strategies in the principal-agent model
- Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
- Reward schemes
- Value of communication in agencies
- Channels coordination game model based on result fairness preference and reciprocal fairness preference: a behavior game forecasting and analysis method
- Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
- A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- Multiple tasks and political organization
- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts
- Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Equal sharing in partnerships?
- Asset pricing under optimal contracts
- A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
- Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies
- Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
- Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
- Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
- Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
- Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
- On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
- Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
- On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
- Wealth effects and agency costs
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice
- A general framework for robust contracting models
- Flexible moral hazard problems
- The optimality of team contracts
- The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent
- A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- A principal-agent model of sequential testing
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
- Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
- The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type
- Social network learning: uncertainty, heterogeneity, and the application in principal-agent relationships
- Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming
- Mechanism design of fashion virtual enterprise under monitoring strategy
- Uncertainty, risk, and the efficiencies of the principal and the agent: a chance constrained data envelopment analysis approach
- Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
- An equilibrium model of child maltreatment
- Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
- An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
- Reinsurance contract design with heterogeneous beliefs and learning
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
- An agency perspective for multi-mode project scheduling with time/cost trade-offs
- Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
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