Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0895-6zbMATH Open1367.91144OpenAlexW2128261246MaRDI QIDQ496871FDOQ496871

Authors: Ayça Kaya, Galina Vereshchagina 

Publication date: 22 September 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6

Recommendations

• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
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• Incentives and the structure of teams
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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpartnershipsassortative matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Assortative Matching and Search
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints
• Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution
• The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
• Incentives and the structure of teams

Cited In (12)

• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
• Sorting expertise
• The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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