Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0895-6MaRDI QIDQ496871zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ayça Kaya, Galina Vereshchagina

Publication date 22 September 2015

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpartnershipsassortative matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Assortative matching and risk sharing

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Assortative Matching and Search
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

Cited in

(12)

• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
• Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns
• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard
• Sorting expertise
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard

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