Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Assortative Matching and Search
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
- Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
- Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
- The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
- To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints
Cited in
(12)- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
- Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
- Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns
- Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
- Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes
- The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Sorting expertise
- Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
- Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
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