Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
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Publication:496871
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6zbMath1367.91144OpenAlexW2128261246MaRDI QIDQ496871
Ayça Kaya, Galina Vereshchagina
Publication date: 22 September 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6
Related Items (3)
Sorting expertise ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Incentives and the structure of teams
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