Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2874zbMath1010.91058OpenAlexW2074591574MaRDI QIDQ1601448

Robert M. Townsend, Edward Simpson Prescott

Publication date: 20 May 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2874

zbMATH Keywords

inequalitymoral hazardorganizationsrisk sharingcollusioneconometric tests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

Observability and endogenous organizations ⋮ Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research ⋮ Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design ⋮ Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm ⋮ Introduction to sunspots and lotteries

Cites Work

• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Using mixture models to detect sex bias in health outcomes in Bangladesh
• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Household Composition, Labor Markets, and Labor Demand: Testing for Separation in Agricultural Household Models
• LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
• Community Preference Fields

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