Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
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Publication:1601448
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2874zbMath1010.91058OpenAlexW2074591574MaRDI QIDQ1601448
Robert M. Townsend, Edward Simpson Prescott
Publication date: 20 May 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2874
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