Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
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Publication:1601448
Recommendations
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Cites work
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- Community Preference Fields
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- Household Composition, Labor Markets, and Labor Demand: Testing for Separation in Agricultural Household Models
- LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Using mixture models to detect sex bias in health outcomes in Bangladesh
- Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
Cited in
(5)- Introduction to sunspots and lotteries
- Observability and endogenous organizations
- Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
- Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
- Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
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