Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization

DOI10.7916/D8DN4CJJMaRDI QIDQ2365330zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Legros, Andrew Newman

Publication date 23 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0092

zbMATH Keywords

firm formationgeneral equilibrium model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(18)

• Credit market imperfections and the separation of ownership from control
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model
• Wealth effects and agency costs
• On efficient firm formation
• Verifiability and group formation in markets
• Observability and endogenous organizations
• The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching
• Competitive markets with private information on both sides
• Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution
• Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
• Dynastic accumulation of wealth
• Organization and inequality in a knowledge economy
• Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
• CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND THE INCIDENCE OF WORKER‐OWNED FIRMS
• Efficient organization of production: nested versus horizontal outsourcing
• The ``value principle in management practices, organizational design, and industrial organization
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design

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