On efficient firm formation

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.06.001zbMath1448.91144OpenAlexW3038743596MaRDI QIDQ2203491

Hans Gersbach, Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 7 October 2020

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

hold-up problemfirm formationefficient firm structurereinvestment-proof equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
• A Tiebout theorem
• Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
• Valuation equilibrium with clubs
• The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
• Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets
• Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
• Power in a Theory of the Firm
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Groups and Markets
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• Clubs and the market: Large finite economies

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