Power in a Theory of the Firm
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Publication:4266360
DOI10.1162/003355398555630zbMATH Open0936.91038OpenAlexW4249657024MaRDI QIDQ4266360FDOQ4266360
Authors: Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales 
Publication date: 30 September 1999
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555630
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