Power in a Theory of the Firm

DOI10.1162/003355398555630MaRDI QIDQ4266360zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales

Publication date 30 September 1999

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555630

zbMATH Keywords

theory of the firmimplicit property rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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(14)

• Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
• Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict
• Contest for power in organizations
• Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Customized transportation, equity participation, and cooperation performance within logistics supply chains
• A theory of firm scope
• The countervailing power hypothesis in the dominant firm-competitive fringe model
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Power and public goods
• Teamwork efficiency and company size
• Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium
• On efficient firm formation
• Rejoinder on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications

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