Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0327-3MaRDI QIDQ1006364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dalia Marin, T. Verdier

Publication date 24 March 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0327-3

zbMATH Keywords

IncentivesIndustry equilibriumMultinationalsPower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Multinational Corporations and Trade Structure
• Organizing the global value chain
• Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure
• Cultural differences, insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision
• Power in a Theory of the Firm

Cites work

• Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure
• Organization and inequality in a knowledge economy

Cited in

(10)

• Cultural differences, insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision
• Symposium on organization, heterogeneity and trade
• Divide and rule: geographical diversification and the multinational firm
• Global ownership patterns
• Multinationals: too many or too few? -- The proximity-concentration trade-off
• Study on the control mechanism of China aerospace enterprises' binary multinational operation
• Power in a Theory of the Firm
• Optimizing an International Network of Partially Owned Plants Under Conditions of Trade Liberalization
• The countervailing power hypothesis in the dominant firm-competitive fringe model
• Firm organization with multiple establishments

This page was built for publication: Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1006364)