A theory of firm scope
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Publication:3563863
DOI10.1162/QJEC.2010.125.2.483zbMATH Open1231.91274OpenAlexW4244744873MaRDI QIDQ3563863FDOQ3563863
Authors: Oliver D. Hart, Bengt Holmstrom
Publication date: 1 June 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58806
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cited In (10)
- On surplus-sharing in partnerships
- The cost of appropriation and firm boundaries
- Noncontractible investments and reference points
- Resource configuration, inter-firm networks, and organizational performance
- A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling
- Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design
- Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- The horizontal scope of the firm: organizational tradeoffs vs. Buyer-supplier relationships
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
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