Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0130zbMATH Open1519.91151MaRDI QIDQ6136259FDOQ6136259

Authors: Yutaka Suzuki 

Publication date: 29 August 2023

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Decentralization and collusion
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies
• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy

zbMATH Keywords

collusionshadingorganization designsupervisioncollusion-proof versus equilibrium collusionhaggling cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A theory of reciprocity
• A theory of firm scope
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing

Cited In (4)

• Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies

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