Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0130MaRDI QIDQ6136259zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yutaka Suzuki

Publication date 29 August 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

collusionshadingorganization designsupervisioncollusion-proof versus equilibrium collusionhaggling cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Decentralization and collusion
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies
• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy

Cites work

• A theory of firm scope
• A theory of reciprocity
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

Cited in

(4)

• Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies

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