Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design

DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-0130zbMath1519.91151MaRDI QIDQ6136259

Yutaka Suzuki

Publication date: 29 August 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

shadingcollusionorganization designsupervisioncollusion-proof versus equilibrium collusionhaggling cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• A theory of reciprocity
• A Theory of Firm Scope^*
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

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