Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2667268
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.003zbMath1478.91105MaRDI QIDQ2667268
Le Zhang, Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23485/1/Dept_Econ_WP2001.pdf
91A55: Games of timing
91B41: Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection)
91B43: Principal-agent models
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Decentralization and collusion
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
- Collusion and discrimination in organizations
- The Bargaining Problem
- Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
- Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
- PEER TRANSPARENCY IN TEAMS: DOES IT HELP OR HINDER INCENTIVES?*
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency