Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
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Publication:4368684
DOI10.2307/2971717zbMATH Open0889.90042OpenAlexW2105525281MaRDI QIDQ4368684FDOQ4368684
Authors: Roland Strausz 
Publication date: 22 June 1998
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/delegation-of-monitoring-in-a-principalagent-relationship(7b745873-4687-47ee-afc3-92d903397360).html
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