Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.010MaRDI QIDQ996364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Fahad Khalil, David Martimort, Bruno M. Parigi

Publication date 14 September 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16142/1/martimort_khalil_parigi.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencycostly state verificationMonitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
• Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
• Monitoring experts
• Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship

Cites work

• Common Agency
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Contracting with Externalities
• Corporate governance
• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations

Cited in

(6)

• Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
• A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
• Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors system by changing community paradigm with population flow

This page was built for publication: Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q996364)