Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.010zbMATH Open1186.91131DBLPjournals/jet/KhalilMP07OpenAlexW3123594775WikidataQ61068312 ScholiaQ61068312MaRDI QIDQ996364FDOQ996364

Authors: Fahad Khalil, David Martimort, Bruno M. Parigi 

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16142/1/martimort_khalil_parigi.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

common agencycostly state verificationMonitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Common Agency
• Contracting with Externalities
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
• Corporate governance

Cited In (5)

• Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
• A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors system by changing community paradigm with population flow

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