Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.010zbMath1186.91131OpenAlexW3123594775WikidataQ61068312 ScholiaQ61068312MaRDI QIDQ996364

David Martimort, Fahad Khalil, Bruno M. Parigi

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16142/1/martimort_khalil_parigi.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencycostly state verificationMonitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Common Agency
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Contracting with Externalities
• The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• Corporate Governance
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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