The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5475004
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345zbMath1142.91613OpenAlexW3124642799MaRDI QIDQ5475004
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp575.pdf
Related Items
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, Common agency with risk-averse agent, On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting, Policy bias equivalence under common agency, Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection, Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance, Menu theorems for bilateral contracting, Interactive Information Design, Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness, A note on common agency models of moral hazard, Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing., Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market, REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION, Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals, Reciprocal contracting, Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative design, Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency., Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility, On second-price auctions and imperfect competition., A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game, Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword, Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information, Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences, Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets, Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium, Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games, On the use of menus in sequential common agency, Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples, Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency, Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection, Technical Note—Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information, Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem, Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game, Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting, On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition, Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria, Sequential contracting with multiple principals, Selecting equilibria in common agency games, Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium, On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts, Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games, Private communication in competing mechanism games, Participation constraints in adverse selection models, Nonexclusive competition for a freelancer under adverse selection
