The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(45)

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
Sequential contracting with multiple principals
Selecting equilibria in common agency games
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
Participation constraints in adverse selection models
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
A note on common agency models of moral hazard
Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative design
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
Nonexclusive competition for a freelancer under adverse selection
Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
Private communication in competing mechanism games
Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market
Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
Policy bias equivalence under common agency
Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
Interactive information design
Technical note: Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information
REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets
Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
Common agency with risk-averse agent
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
Reciprocal contracting
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
On the use of menus in sequential common agency
Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

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