Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium

DOI10.3934/jdg.2018019zbMath1422.91044OpenAlexW3122646580WikidataQ129110379 ScholiaQ129110379MaRDI QIDQ2319667

Yu Chen

Publication date: 20 August 2019

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2018019

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designex post equilibriummulti-agencydelegation principlemenu design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.
• Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
• Measurable relations
• Optimal Plans for Dynamic Programming Problems
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• On pointwise convergence, compactness and equicontinuity in the lifting topology. I
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy

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