Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard

DOI10.1007/BF01211443zbMath0807.90008MaRDI QIDQ1338081

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 1 March 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionPolish spacemoral hazardcompact metric spaceincomplete information monopolistoptimal screening mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

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