The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
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Cites work
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- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022658 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2171466 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
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- New sequential compactness results for spaces of scalarly integrable functions
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- Real analysis
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- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
Cited in
(8)- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Equilibria in abstract economies with a continuum of agents with discontinuous and non-ordered preferences
- Exploiting overconfidence: optimal contracts with heterogeneous beliefs
- A general method for the existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
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