Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

DOI10.2307/1911363MaRDI QIDQ3801283zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ian Jewitt

Publication date 1988

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911363

zbMATH Keywords

convexitytotal positivityprincipal-agent decision problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(95)

• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Endogenous criteria for success
• Optimal Dynamic Reinsurance Under Heterogeneous Beliefs and CARA Utility
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model
• The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions.
• Exploiting overconfidence: optimal contracts with heterogeneous beliefs
• The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• An envelope approach to tournament design
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• A dual approach to agency problems
• Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
• Posterior probabilities: nonmonotonicity, asymptotic rates, log-concavity, and Turán's inequality
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Monotone second-best optimal contracts
• The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
• The nature of tournaments
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money
• Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• The probability approach to general equilibrium with production
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Perspectives of Risk Sharing
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
• Time of the essence
• Economic juries and public project provision
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
• Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
• A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• A general method for the existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
• A polynomial optimization approach to principal-agent problems
• A note on pricing with risk aversion
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• The general solution to the principal-agent problem with asymmetrical information under uncertainty and risk
• Moral hazard in loss reduction and state-dependent utility
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• An information inequality for agency problems
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Full downside risk aversion
• Optimal insurance for repetitive natural disasters under moral hazard
• On the validity of the first-order approach with moral hazard and hidden assets
• On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
• Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market
• On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
• Compensation and Transfer Pricing in a Principal-Agent Model
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• Shaking the tree: an agency-theoretic model of asset pricing
• Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
• Tournament rewards and heavy tails
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
• Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
• A classification approach to general s-shaped utility optimization with principals' constraints
• Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard
• Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
• Ordinal aggregation results via Karlin's variation diminishing property
• A computer simulation and analysis to the principal agent model
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
• Endogenous risk and protection premiums
• Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation
• Pareto-improving tax reforms and the earned income tax credit
• Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
• What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?
• Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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