Time of the essence

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.02.009MaRDI QIDQ2496788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Flavio Toxvaerd

Publication date 20 July 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

deadlinesdeliverydynamic moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• A theory of optimal deadlines
• Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
• How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
• Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
• Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

Cites work

• Deadlines and distractions
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Temptation and Self-Control
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(8)

• How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
• Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
• Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement
• Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Setbacks, shutdowns, and overruns
• A theory of optimal deadlines
• Deadlines and distractions

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