Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience

DOI10.1007/S10700-019-09302-YzbMATH Open1433.91086OpenAlexW2944786642WikidataQ127907044 ScholiaQ127907044MaRDI QIDQ2302437FDOQ2302437

Authors: Yanfei Lan, Ruiqing Zhao, Changjing Shang, Zhihua Chen 

Publication date: 26 February 2020

Published in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pure.aber.ac.uk/ws/files/30038490/Deadline_based_incentive_contracts_in_project_management_with_cost_salience.pdf

Recommendations

• Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
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• Time of the essence
• A theory of optimal deadlines

zbMATH Keywords

uncertainty theoryinformation asymmetryproject managementincentive mechanismcost salience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Uncertainty theory
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Extreme value theorems of uncertain process with application to insurance risk model
• Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
• An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
• The impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard in R\&D project under uncertain environment
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion

Cited In (7)

• Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
• The inventory replenishment policy in an uncertain production-inventory-routing system
• Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
• Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
• Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects
• Work More Tomorrow: Resolving Present Bias in Project Management
• A fixed charge transportation problem with damageable items under uncertain environment

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