Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
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Publication:2302437
Recommendations
- Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
- Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
- Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
- Time of the essence
- A theory of optimal deadlines
Cites work
- An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
- Extreme value theorems of uncertain process with application to insurance risk model
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
- Incentives for Procrastinators
- Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
- The impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard in R\&D project under uncertain environment
- Uncertainty theory
Cited in
(7)- The inventory replenishment policy in an uncertain production-inventory-routing system
- Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects
- Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
- Work More Tomorrow: Resolving Present Bias in Project Management
- A fixed charge transportation problem with damageable items under uncertain environment
- Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
- Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
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