Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
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Publication:4596551
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_6zbMATH Open1376.91105OpenAlexW2528785573MaRDI QIDQ4596551FDOQ4596551
Authors: Christopher S. Tang, Kairen Zhang, Sean X. Zhou 
Publication date: 1 December 2017
Published in: Springer Series in Supply Chain Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_6
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- Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
- Time of the essence
- Project contracting strategies for managing team dynamics
- Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects
- Work More Tomorrow: Resolving Present Bias in Project Management
- Uncertainty in procurement contracting with time incentives
- Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
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