Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_6MaRDI QIDQ4596551zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher S. Tang, Kairen Zhang, Sean X. Zhou

Publication date 1 December 2017

Published in Springer Series in Supply Chain Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
• Time of the essence
• Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
• Uncertainty in procurement contracting with time incentives
• How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

Cited in

(11)

• How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
• Game-theoretic modeling of the project management contract
• Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
• Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
• The impact of disruption and delay when compressing large projects: going for incentives?
• Time of the essence
• Project contracting strategies for managing team dynamics
• Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects
• Work More Tomorrow: Resolving Present Bias in Project Management
• Uncertainty in procurement contracting with time incentives
• Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience

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